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The Process of Peace-Making
following Operation "Desert Storm"=zBy

Sompong Sucharitkul, San Francisco :~:~
I. Introduction
On August 2, 1990, the whole world witnessed an unprecedented event
in modern history, the unprovoked invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi armed
forces. The invasion itself was historic in the sense that in this day and
age it was still possible for one militarily powerful Asian Arab State to
invade and overrun its relatively weaker sister State and to proceed to
declare its annexation without fear of adverse reactions from the
international community. That the Iraqi leaders miscalculated United
States reactions and subsequent world-wide repercussions no one could
today gainsay. Nor indeed could anybody deny Iraq's overestimation of

* In its original version, this study was a paper presented by the author at
the First Fulbright Symposium on "Challenges for the World Legal Order: The
First Decade of the Twentieth Century", Panel II: Collective Peace-Keeping, a
Chance for International Peace and Humanity. The paper was entitled
"Multinational Peace-Keeping Operations: Past, Present and Future and the
Process of Peace-Making", April 9, 1991, at Golden Gate University School of
Law, San Francisco.
''* B. A. Hons., M. A., B. C. L., D. Phil., D. C. L. (Oxford); Docteur en
Droit (Paris); LL. M. (Harvard); Visiting of the Middle Temple, Barrister-atLaw (United Kingdom); Distinguished Professor of International and
Comparative Law (Golden Gate University School of Law); Former Member
and Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission; Former
Fulbright Professor of International Law and World Affairs; Member of the
lnstitut de Droit International; Member of the Panels of Arbitrators and of
Conciliators of ICSID (World Bank); Corresponding Collaborator of
UNIDROIT.
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its own military might. But what actually transpired went well beyond
Iraq's nightmare. The series of continuing counter-measures in the form
of corrective, punitive and remedial sanctions, adopted by the Security
Council of the United Nations from the earliest stage of hostilities until
today could not have been foreseen by any nation, Iraq included.
In attempting an analytical exploration of the legal aspects the
operations taken under the authority of the Security Council and the
inevitable peace-making process, it would appear highly practical and
useful to take into account the resurgence in this "Decade of
International Law" 1 of a new "International Legal Order" curiously
resembling the new "World Legal Order" as envisaged by the framers
of the San Francisco Charter in 1945, whose dreams were shared by
many. We have come a long way since.
The preceding decade of the eighties had witnessed a paradoxical
transition, a change or rather exchange of positions and attitudes
between the West and the Socialist countries. As the latter began to
show greater respect for and reliance on the United Nations 2 with the
overwhelming support from the so-called third world or the Group of
77 and the non-aligned nations, the West, most of all the United States
and its closest Western allies, appear to have grown more disenchanted
with, if not altogether disillusioned by, the stand taken by some
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations as well as the World
Organization itselP.

II. Multi-national Military Operations Past, Present and Future
A. World War II (1939-1945)
Before embarking on the study of the United Nations experience in
collective peace-keeping, it is useful to catch a glimpse of an earlier
1
See General Assembly Resolution 44/23 of November 17, 1989, moved by
the non-aligned countries following the initiative taken by their foreign
ministers at the Conference in The Hague on June 26-29, 1989. See also
United Nations Decade of International Law, Report of the Secretary-General,
U.N.Doc. A/45/430 (1990); and two addenda U.N. Doc. A/45/430/Add. 1
(1990), and Add. 2 (1990).
2
This change of attitude on the part of China and the Soviet Union
coincided with a transitional period not only in the field of economic theories
but more so in their increasing respect for and reliance on international
organizations such as the United Nations and its specialized agencies.
3
This culminated in the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO followed by the
United Kingdom and Singapore. Parallel reactions occurred in other agencies
such as ILO and FAO. The United States under the Reagan Administration
threatened to suspend contribution to the United Nations and remained isolated
in the world-wide endeavours to retain the United States within the framework
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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coalition endeavour which gave birth to the United Nations and to the
signing of the Great San Francisco Charter in 1945.
The latest attempt to unify Europe by force was undertaken by no
lesser Power than the Third Reich under the now admittedly insane and
inhumane Fuhrer Hitler with his supporting Axis in Southern Europe
under 11 Duce Mussolini and the militarist Empire of Japan under Prime
Minister Tojo. Apart from European Unification, the Asian flank of the
Axis also planned to establish its hegemony under the guise of "COPROSPERITY SPHERE", under which Japan was to enjoy the
dominant position in the areas overlapping the zones of influence of
the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., China, France, the
Netherlands and Portugal. Opposing domination and aggression by the
Axis Powers were the Allied Forces, led originally by the United
Kingdom and the Commonwealth of Nations including Canada,
Australia and New Zealand, China, France and the U.S.S.R. and
ultimately since Pearl Harbor by the United States and her Allies in the
Pacific Rim.
The Allies constituted themselves as the United Nations. Hence, the
Charter contains reference to former enemies of the United Nations,
now long forgotten. They included Germany, Italy and Japan.

B. The United Nations Charter (1945)
As originally conceived, the United Nations as the World Organization
was to have as one of its principal organs a Security Council,
empowered to impose sanctions and to secure and restore peace by
whatever means necessary for the maintenance of international peace
and security. Having learned from the bitter experience and repeated
failures of the League of Nations, an organization devoid of
enforcement machinery, the members of the United Nations were
determined to add an effective and meaningful Chapter to the Charter
of the United Nations, namely, Chapter VII.
This Chapter contains provisions from Articles 39 to 51
contemplating actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of
the peace and acts of aggression. It is the primary responsibility of the
Security Council to maintain international peace and security, in
particular to determine the existence of any act of aggression, to make
recommendations or to decide what measures to be taken to restore and
maintain international peace and security in accordance with Articles 41
and 42. Article 41 covers measures including "complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations. Article 42 further permits the taking
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of such action by sea, air or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security" should the Security Council
consider measures under Article 41 inadequate. Actions under Article
42 may include "demonstrations, blockade and other operation by air,
sea or land forces of Members of the United Nations".
In the practice of the United Nations, sanctions and actions
envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter have rarely been used due to an
inherent defect contained in Article 27 of the Charter requiring
decisions of the Security Council on non-procedural matters to be made
by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes
of the permanent members. Even with a strict interpretation adopted in
the subsequent practice of the Security Council treating the expression
"concurring votes" as "non-negative votes" which include abstension
or possible absence or non-participation as opposed to a "veto" or
"negative votes", the use of air, sea and land forces has only been
authorized once in the Korean Conflict in 1950 owing to the absence of
the Soviet delegate boycotting the Council for not seating the
representative of the People's Republic of China. Subsequent action
needed to be approved through an anomalous procedure of "Uniting
for Peace Resolution" 4 •
Other sanctions as envisaged in Article 41 have only been applied
against South Africa and in respect of the purported setting up of a
Government in Rhodesia by the Ian Smith regime in 1965 5 •
C. Operation Desert Storm

1. Self-Defence or Action under Chapter VII

A practical question raised in the discussions by commentators on the
measures taken by multi-national coalition forces was whether the
measures authorized by the Security Council precluded the exercise of
individual or collective self-defence by Kuwait. Different views can be
found regarding the pre-emptive role of the Security Council seized of
an item on its agenda as a threat or breach of the peace or the
determination of an act of aggression 6 • The language of Article 51 is
4
See Resolution of July 7, 1950, on Korean Conflict, authorizing State
members of the United Nations to facilitate military assistance to accomplish the
objectives of Security Council Resolution.
5
See Resolution 217/65 of November 20, 1965, Resolution 232/66 of
December 16, 1966, and Resolutions 213/68, 277/70, 418/77 and 421/77 and
commentary by Diez de Velasco, Instituciones de Derecho Internacional
Publico, Torno II, Organizaciones Internacionales, septima edicion 1990,
pp. 140-157.
6
See, e. g., Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations
Law: U.N. Police Action in Lieu of War "The Old Order Changeth",
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crystal clear: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security".
In the Gulf Crisis, the Security Council was apprised of the
situation from the very start. It adopted its first Resolution on August 2,
1990, Resolution 660 (1990), acting under Articles 39 and 40,
condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, demanding Iraq to
withdraw all its forces, calling upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin
intensive negotiations, and deciding to meet again as necessary to
consider further steps to ensure compliance with the present resolution.
In the second resolution, Resolution 661 (1990) on August 6, 1990,
the Security Council was more specific in its operative paragraphs.

"The Security Council ...
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2
of Resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the legitimate
Government of Kuwait;
2. Decides, as a consequence, to take the following measures to
secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of Resolution 660 (1990)
and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
3. Decides that all States shall prevent: ...
6. Decides to establish; in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional
rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security
Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the
following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its
observations and recommendations: ...
9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 above,
nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the
legitimate Government of Kuwait, and calls upon all States:
.(a) To take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate
Government of Kuwait and its agencies;
(l:i) Not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power.
In its penultimate preambular paragraph, Resolution 660 (1990)
expressly affirms "the inherent right of individual or collective selfFranck & Patel, 85 A.J.I.L. (1991 ), p. 63, and "Until What? Enforcement Action
or Collective Self Defense?", Weston, 85 A.J.I.L. (1991), p. 506.
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defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait in
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter".
The inherent right of self-defence, individual as well as collective, is
thus distinctly reserved and preserved by Security Council Resolution
660 (1990).
However, "measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security" were not yet taken by the Security Council until ten or eleven
resolutions later.
In Resolution 662 (1990) on August 9, 1990, the Security Council
gravely alarmed by the Declaration by Iraq of a "comprehensive and
eternal merger with Kuwait, decides that the annexation of Kuwait by
Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is
considered null and void, and inter alia, calls upon all States,
international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize
that annexation . . . " This was reaffirmed in operative paragraph 3 of
Resolution 664 (1990) on August 18, 1990.
Subsequently, Resolutions 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674 and 677
were all adopted by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of
the Charter.
It was not until Resolution 678 (1990) on November 29, 1990, that,
again acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council
authorized member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait,
to use all necessary means including the use of force to uphold and
implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area". The
use of all necessary means is authorized "unless Iraq on or before 15
January 1991 fully implements ... the foregoing resolutions", i. e.,
Resolutions 660-667.
In fact, no such measures were taken until 45 days after Security
Council Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990 was adopted, i.e., until
the day after January 15, 1991 being the ultimate deadline imposed by
the Security Council. It is still very difficult to determine with absolute
precision the date at which "measures" were in fact taken by the
Security Council "necessary to maintain international peace and
security". Was it January 16, 1991 or rather March 2, 1991, upon the
suspension of combat operations, marking the end of "Operation
Desert Storm" when it could really be said that the Security Council
had not only authorized certain measures to be taken by January 16,
1991, but also the measures thus authorized were successfully taken to
restore and maintain international peace and security? Depending on
the interpretation and determination of the date at which international
peace and security could be considered restored and maintained, until
such date the inherent right of individual and collective self defence

,
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must continue to be exercisable. The right is by no means "dormant" 7 •
It was emphatically reaffirmed from the outset.
But clearly the inherent right of self-defence in any particular
instance may continue to exist only until such time as it becomes too
late to exercise. Just as "restitution stops where repayment begins". The
"Operation Desert Shield" must stop where "Operation Desert Storm"
begins. If "Desert Shield" was an exercise of collective self-defence, it
was designed for the defence of Saudi Arabia and not Kuwait. Measures
designed to "retake" or "restore sovereignty of Kuwait" were reflected
in "Operation Desert Storm", distinguishable from the exercise of any
inherent right of self-defence.
In point of fact, Kuwait's inherent right of individual and collective
self-defence existed when the armed attack by Iraq occurred on August
2, 1990, but that right did not survive the complete take-over of Kuwait
by Iraq. Kuwait had to rely on the United Nations Security Council
measures under Chapter VII not only for its self-defence but more
essentially for the restoration of its sovereignty and the return and
maintenance of international peace and security.
It should be recalled that "Operation Desert Storm" was preceded
by "Operation Desert Shield", undertaken initially as a defence
mechanism to contain further aggression by Iraq against Saudi Arabia
and yonder, and not as an effort to retake Kuwait. It was not until
Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990 that the possibility and prospect
of "retaking of Kuwait" became imminent upon repeated Iraqi refusals
to withdraw from Kuwait. At that moment when the ultimatum
imposed by the Security Council expired, operation "Desert Shield"
could be transformed into operation "Desert Storm".
Without entering too deeply into the controversy whether the
execution of operation "Desert Storm" by the coalition forces of 29
nations was an exercise of the inherent right of collective self-defence
which has been preserved unimpaired by Article 51 of the Charter or
rather an operation pursuant to Security Council Resolution 678 (1990)
on November 29, 1990, the following opinion may be ventured.
There appears to be no apparent necessity to preclude the right of
self-defence from any action authorized by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter. In point of fact, Article 51 is placed
7
See, e. g., Mullerson 's statement at a 1990 Conference on International
Law and the Non-Use of Force, convened jointly by the American Society of
International Law and the Soviet Association of International Law, Washington,
D.C. (October 4-6, 1990). For Secretary-General's comments, see, Washington
Post, November 9, 1990, at A. 30, Col. 5. See also Franck & Patel, 85 AJIL
(1991) at 63, 64. See also Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, pp. 142143 (1988).
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at the end of Chapter VII precisely to preserve unimpaired the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence. To say that the right of
self-defence is dormant once the Security Council is seized of the
situation is not to say that it is not exercisable. The truth is that the
Security Council can affirm and has in fact repeatedly reaffirmed the
possibility of self-defence for as long as the need and the opportunity
continue to exist.
It is at this juncture that a quick glance may be taken at the right of
self-defence, individual and collective. Whichever the case, it cannot be
taken outside the perview of Chapter VII or unreported to the Security
Council. It is clear that it remains unimpaired "until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security". There are thus two crucial questions to be answered.
First is the question of the time at which it could be said that the
Security Council "has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". Secondly, once that moment materializes, how
and to what extent is the inherent right of self-defence, individual and
collective, impaired. Is it temporarily suspended? Or is it no longer
exercisable?
Let us take as a starting point the notion of self-defence in the
practice of States before the advent of the United Nations. It is not
uncommon to hear greater cry for self-defence from a bigger and more
resourceful military power, both in time and in the scope and extent of
its exercise. On the other hand, it is not unusual for a less powerful
nation to be more conservative and restrictive in regard to the scope,
extent as well as duration. Thus, in a classic case concerning The
Caroline in 1838 8 , Mr. Webster on behalf of the United States wrote to
Mr. Fox of the United Kingdom in a dispute relating to the necessity of
self-defence:
"It will be for ... [Her Majesty's] Government to show a necessity
of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and,
no moment of deliberation. It will be for it to show, also that the local
authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment
authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did
nothing unreasonable and excessive; since the act, justified by the
necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept
clearly within it ... A necessity for all this, the Government of the
United States cannot believe to have existed" 9 •
Lord Ashburton replied to Mr. Webster's note in 1842, expressing
satisfaction "to perceive that we are perfectly agreed as to the general
8
9

29 BFSP 1137-1138, 30 BFSP 195-196.
April24, 1841, in 29 BFSP 1137-1138; see jennings in 32 AJIL 82 (1938).
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principles of international law applicable to this unfortunate case.
Respect for the inviolable character of the territory of independent
nations is the most essential foundation of civilization" 10 •
A report made to the League of Nations in 1927 confirmed the
principle of proportionality in the exercise of legitimate defence. Only
measures proportionate to the seriousness of the attack and justified by
the seriousness of the danger may be adopted 11 •
As Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter prohibits the use of force
without impairing the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of
the Charter, attempts have been made on the part of stronger States to
expand the notion of self-defence. To cite but a few examples, the
quarantine imposed by the United States during the Missiles Crisis of
1962 was partially based on the necessity of self-defence 12 • The abortive
rescue attempts pending the proceedings in the Hostages Case between
the United States and Iran (April 24-25, 1980) were inspired by
humanitarian considerations and claimed by the United States to be in
exercise of its inherent right of self-defence. So were also the military
and para-military activities conducted by the United States in and
against Nicaragua. In neither case could the International Court find its
way to treating the use of force by the United States as an exercise of the
inherent right of self-defence, individual or collective 13 •
The question under review in the Gulf Crisis is not whether Kuwait
had the inherent right to self-defence when the armed attack occurred
on August 2, 1990. This was clearly confirmed by the Security Council
in Resolution 660 (1990). Nor was there any doubt regarding the
legitimacy of measures taken by States in response to the various
Security Council Resolutions whether as sanctions to induce
compliance by Iraq or as enforcement measures including the use of
force authorized by the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII
(Articles 41 and 42) to restore and maintain international peace and
security.
10
July 28, 1842, 30 BFSP 195-196, Lord Ashburton made an effort to
justify the British action in accordance with the test formulated by Mr. Webster,
which has commonly been accepted as indicating the circumstances precluding
wrongfulness in the exercise of self-defence.
11
L. o. N. Doc. A. 14, 1927. V. V. Legal 1927, V. 14, pp. 60-69.
12
Dean Acheson thought every nation had the right to survive and that
survival of States is not a matter of law. Dean Acheson, 57 ASIL Proc. 14 (1963).
13
While the rescue attempts were close to self-help which the Court did not
take so kindly as they tended "to undermine" respect for the judicial process in
international relations while the activities against Nicaragua were held to be
unlawful intervention and not justified by any necessity of collective selfdefence. See ICJ Reports 1980, Judgement of May 24, 1980, paras 32 and 93-94,
and ibid., 1986, Judgement of June 27, 1986, para 293 (2).

'•
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The question that may still be validly asked is whether the action
taken by the Security Council or measures taken by States in response
to its resolutions by way of sanction, prevention or enforcement
necessarily preclude the exercise of self-defence, individual or collective.
The answer is clearly in the negative. The two notions or actions are not
mutually exclusive. They are never intended to be mutually exclusive.
In fact, measures taken with the authorization of the Security Council
under Chapter VII could overlap or overshadow all measures of selfdefence, individual or collective.
It was apparent on the other hand that after Iraq's declared merger
with Kuwait, the exercise of Kuwait's inherent right of individual selfdefence was almost irretrievably lost. The deposed Kuwaiti Government had no possibility of defending itself single-handed. Collective
self-defence was still conceivable if actions were taken under the League
of Arab States.
A question may be raised as to the duration of the lapse of time
needed for the waning right of self-defence to be revived. The sooner
sovereignty is restored to the victim of aggression, the earlier the revival
of the inherent right of self-defence in actual fact. It is useful to note,
however, that in point of law, the Security Council has declared the
purported annexation of Kuwait by Iraq to be null and void, thereby
preventing the lapse of time or extinctive prescription from running
against the rights and interests of Kuwait to recover its sovereignty.
Once the Security Council has decided to adopt measures
effectively to restore and maintain the peace and security in Kuwait,
the possibility of Kuwait exercising its inherent right of self-defence has
become academic, whether individual or collective, within or without
the United Nations. In any event, self-defence has been well
overreached if not overtaken by United Nations action authorized
under Chapter VII.
2. The Borderline between Self-Defence and Counter-Measures
The second question that has been raised in connection with operation
"Desert Storm" is whether the operation is to be considered as an
independent exercise of collective self-defence or as forming part and
parcel of the series of counter-measures taken by States and
international organizations, including the multi-national coalition
forces against Iraq.
Among the sanctions in the form of counter-measures authorized
by Security Council resolutions against Iraq may be mentioned, the
deployment of maritime forces and the use of such measures
commensurate to the specific circumstances to halt all inward and
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outward maritime shipping (Resolution 665), the placement of an
embargo on import and export to and from Iraq or Kuwait by air or by
sea (Resolution 670) and ultimately the use of all necessary means to
restore and maintain international peace and security (Resolution 678).
Counter-measures and self-defence are both relevant as distinct sets
of circumstances precluding wrongfulness. They are distinguishable in
more than one respects. Counter-measures in the form of punitive,
preventive or enforcement measures may be applicable as consequences
of an internationally wrongful act and not simply as circumstances
precluding wrongfulness. Thus, the International Law Commission
considers legitimate counter-measure against a State which has
committed an internationally wrongful act under Article 30 of the
draft articles on State Responsibility 14 • This may include different types
of reaction to an internationally wrongful act, such as retorsion, reprisal
and other forms of retaliation which could be compensatory, remedial
or even punitive in nature and can be viewed as sanctions or
enforcement measures.
On the other hand, Article 34 provides in the same context that a
lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of
the United Nations equally precludes the wrongfulness of an act of a
State not in conformity with an international obligation of that State.
Admittedly, a State acting in self-defence acts in response to an
imminent danger or peril, which, not unlike the case of state of
necessity, must be serious, immediate and incapable of being countered
by other means. It is doubtful whether operation "Desert Storm" was
undertaken "without any choice of means or any moment of
deliberation". Furthermore, self-defence and counter-measures (sanctions or enforcement measures) are reactions which relate to different
points in time and above all are logically distinct. Action in self-defence
is action taken by a State to defend its territorial integrity or its
independence against violent attack. It is action whereby "defensive"
means are used to resist an "offensive" use of armed force, with the
object of preventing another wrongful action from proceeding and
achieving its purpose. Action taking the form of a sanction or countermeasure on the other hand consists in the application ex post facto, to a
State committing a wrongful act of one of the possible consequences
that international law attaches to the commission of such an act. In
other words, self-defence is a reaction to the commission of a specific
kind of internationally wrongful act such as an armed attack, whereas
counter-measures, including sanctions and even reprisals are reactions

I

14

See commentary in Yearbook of the ILC 1979, Vol. II (Part Two),
pp. 115-122.
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that fall within the context of the operation of the consequences of the
internationally wrongful act in terms of international responsibility.
Nowadays, however, only sanctions referred to in Chapter VII of the
Charter can entail a lawful use of force 15 •
As for operation "Desert Storm", inasmuch as it was well within the
measures authorized by Resolution 678 (1990), the question is more
purely academic whether the use of force by the coalition forces in
response to Iraqi armed attack exceeded the limits of self-defence in
scope or in time, or the rule of proportionality. They are nonetheless
sanctions authorized by the United Nations to restore peace and
security in the area. Since operation "Desert Storm" involved the use of
force, it can only be justified either as an act of self-defence or as lawful
counter-measures. It would serve no useful purpose to determine
whether such legitimate measures were exclusively collective selfdefence which could have been taken outside the framework of the
United Nations, while in the actual occurrence, they were specifically
authorized as sanction by the United Nations to ensure compliance of
its resolutions by Iraq.

D. The Future of Multi-National Coalition in Support of United
Nations Sanctions
A more fundamental and general challenge relates to the future role of
multi-national coalition of the unprecedented kind against Iraqi
aggression contributed by no fewer than 29 nations including Kuwait
and authorized by a principal political organ of the United Nations. A
practical lesson may be learned from the steps taken in the discharge of
the primary responsibility of the Security Council which could be
followed in future cases of aggression. Assurances should be given that
in future peace will be kept by resorting to the same procedure for the
peace-restoring operation authorized by the Security Council. The facts
of the Iraqi aggression are not likely to be repeated in future events
involving another oil rich country attacked by another neighbouring
State. The question is whether the positive elements within the Security
Council will continue to be present to pre-empt the recurrence of future
acts of aggression. The United States would in all likelihood be
prepared to come to the rescue of a country like Grenada if attacked by
another country like Cuba. But would the same answer be given if an
invasion occurred outside its traditional spheres of influence, say in
Eastern Europe? It is difficult to predict in advance how nations will
behave or react in like circumstances. Furthermore, other key roles are
15

See Commentary to Article 34: Self-Defence, in Yearbook of ILC 1980,
Vol. II (Part Two), pp. 52-61.
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played by all the other permanent members of the Security Council. If
only one of them said no to any proposal or any draft Resolution, the
whole coalition would be aborted or still-born. China could veto such a
move. The Soviet Union would have vetoed such a coalition, had the
event occurred prior to the adoption of Perestroika and Glasnost, and
before the Soviet Enlightenment. At least, we have the coincidence of
these occurrences to be thankful for in the current situation. The
question remains whether these changes of attitude, and changes of
heart, are here to stay. Can we depend on the whims of the leaders and
on the winds and currents of international politics?
The so-called New World Legal Order is not at all new. It is but a
recent show of its inner character of its true self, as we created it in 1945.
Only we have become more true to the commitments and to the goals
to which we had earlier pledged ourselves. The future really depends on
our continued sincerity and determination to uphold the Rule of Law
irrespective of short-term national interests. The Rule of Law must be
resuscitated and further reinforced by the jus cogens principle of nonuse of force. The use of force is forever illicit except for individual or
collective self-defence against an armed attack. Unfortunately, superior
force can only be repelled by the legitimate, deliberate, measured and
collective use of multi-national forces which in the event of a complete
take-over could only be authorized by the Security Council, as the
primarily responsible organ of the World Legal Order. Operation
"Desert Storm" is a classic example of legitimate, limited and
proportionate use of force authorized by the Security Council in
conformity with the Charter as a counter-measure to undo the
consequences of an act of aggression and to redeem the sovereign
rights of an independent nation when self-defence, individual or
collective has been of no avail.
This is by no means an endorsement of the equation of the current
World Legal Order with the "partnership" between "the Rule of Law"
and "the Responsible Application of Force" 16 • It should be emphasized
that under contemporary international law, there is no room for the use
of force by States except in self-defence or as authorized by the United
Nations. The notion of "responsible application of force" will open the
door to endless abuses by providing an unwarranted excuse for resort
to the use of force otherwise absolutely prohibited by law. It is not
16
See, e. g., Ambassador Thomas Pickering's statement in the Security
Council on March 2, 1991. President Bush is reported to have referred to the
"New World Order" where there is the right of everyone to say "No" to
aggression, and enforceability is reflected in the power to enforce the Rule of
Law.
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enough that force is applied responsibly. The application of force is not
at all possible without prior authorization, and even when authorized it
has to be applied responsibly.

III. The Process of Peace-Making
The present is still vivid in the mind of the world, thanks to the
exposure of modern techniques in telecommunication and the complete
coverage given by news media of the combat operations of the coalition
forces conducted by the United States and 28 other nations to secure
implementation of Resolution 660 17 and 10 other resolutions 18 as
authorized by Resolution 678 19 of the Security Council with the
resulting casualties of more than one hundred thousand Iraqi troops
and civilians. The multi-national peace-keeping operation has been
successful in its primary objectives of restoration of peace and security
and in the return of the legitimate government of Kuwait to its
homeland. Much remains however to be done by way of reconstruction, rehabilitation and normalization of the conditions existing prior to
August 2, 1990.
The environmental aspects of the ruins and remnants of the
embattled theatre in Kuwait and the general pollution of the air and
water throughout Kuwait and over the entire region of the Persian Gulf
will take years and billions of dollars to recuperate. The restoration of
environmental conditions fit for human habitation presents a real
challenge to the scientists, hydrologists and ecologists of all times.
It was not until April 3, 1991 that the Security Council adopted its
fourteenth Resolution 20 defining strict conditions for a permanent
cease-fire between the Iraqi forces and the multi-national coalition
forces authorized by its Resolution 678. It remains to be seen whether
the measures envisaged by this longest Resolution ever will be accepted
and implemented by Iraq. If so this would mark the termination of
hostilities in a more permanent and formal manner 21 •
Questions of reparation and restitution of private property have yet
to be heard, considered and resolved. The exchange of prisoners of war
17

UNSC Resolution 660, August 2, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1323 (1990).
UNSC Resolutions 661, 662, 664, 665, 667, 669, 670, 674, 677 (1990).
Dietrich Schindler also lists 15 Security Council Resolutions in Revue suisse de
droit international et de droit europeen, 1/1991, p. 3 at pp. 4-5.
19
UNSC Resolution 678, November 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990); see
also UNSC Resolution 686 of March 2, 1991.
20
UNSC Resolution 687, April 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991); see also
fifteenth Resolution of the Security Council 688, April 5, 1991. Ibid. p. 858.
21
For further details of the conditions for permanent cease-fire set by the
Security Council and its future implementation, see Section III, B below.
18
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may have got off on the right footing. The military personnel of the
coalition forces held by Iraq have all been released, although the return
of civilian detainees is still being monitored. Casualties of the campaign
have been extraordinarily light on the side of the coalition forces, except
for the accident of a friendly fire and the fortuitous event of one scud
missile in Saudi Arabia. In any case of casualties, death or injuries, the
Law of State Responsibility applies to all Parties, be it Iraq or the
unintended errors of a friendly fire.
At present evidence is being gathered and collated to substantiate
the various claims, private as well as governmental, as the victims of
Iraqi acts of aggression spread far and wide throughout Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates and the countries bordering the Persian
Gulf as well as other members of the League of Arab States, and even
Israel in connection with resulting damage and loss of lives and
properties following the scud missiles attacks by Iraq.
Eventually, international claims commissions will be set up to
consider and settle such claims. The real challenge to the world is where
and how to retrieve the hidden resources of Iraq to satisfy the awards
rendered. The ultimate responsibility will unfairly have to be borne by
innocent subsequent generations of Iraqi civilians. The only comfort
that is plausible may consist in the harsh reality of international life that
each people has to account for the imperfections of its own government.
The lesson to be drawn from this challenge is that there is also reverse
vicarious liability or imputability of residual liability to the people.
Whether or not and to whatever extent a regime may be democratic, the
people must also answer for the acts of aggression and for the cruel and
inhuman treatment attributable to the government they have chosen or
tolerated. If the innocent Iraqi people have to pay for the wrongs
committed by Iraqi officials, it is because they have been too
complacent and have failed to perform their civic duties in choosing
their own government and in tolerating or acquiescing in the nefarious
activities of the despotic government. No people can escape the ultimate
international responsibility by pleading complacency, ignorance or
inaction. Every people ought to be active and to control the actions of
the government. That is why the General Assembly repeatedly
recognized the permanent sovereignty of each people over natural
resources within national boundary.
It does not follow that the Government, its agencies and leaders can
escape their primary liability or their official and personal responsibilities with regard to all these claims nor for that matter for the offences
against the peace and security of mankind. International tribunals may
be established on the models of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals to
prosecute and adjudge the offences against international law and to
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punish those found guilty of such offences and violations of
international law. There can be no doubt that the State of Iraq, its
Government and agents are officially and personally accountable for the
various breaches of international obligations, specifically contained in
the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and on Consular Relations and
in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the Treatment of Civilians in
Non-National Armed Conflict, and the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Students of modern international law will recall that war is normally
terminated by the conclusion of a peace treaty. War may break out by
the start of hostilities or by a declaration of war. Before the state of war
or the existence of an armed conflict can be said to have come to an end,
a number of significant events may occur.
Combat operations may stop and hostilities may terminate
altogether. Thus, an end may be put to the shooting war by the
adoption of a ceasefire which is a military arrangement reached between
the opposing commanders in the field. A cease-fire which is initially
provisional or temporary can become more permanent upon further
negotiations and conclusion of a formal cease-fire agreement, specifying
in greater details the conditions to be observed by the parties to the
cease-fire.
From the moment of cessation of hostilities as evidenced by the
formal cease-fire agreement to the end of the state of war, there may be
an extended period of relative peace without combat operations and
without formal restoration of peaceful conditions or the return of peace
as signalled by the conclusion of a treaty of peace to end the state of war
or terminate the legal existence of an armed conflict.
The practice of States indicates that major wars especially global
wars have been terminated by the conclusion of a collective peace treaty
such as the Treaty of Versailles after World War F 2 or a series of
bilateral and multilateral peace treaties such as the Peace Treaty between
the United States and Japan terminating the state of war between the
two States in 1951 23 • The process of peace-making generally takes a
long time to complete after the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement. It
is thus an indispensable final phase of ending the state of war or the
return to normalcy after terminating the armed conflict.
In the current armed conflict between Iraq and Kuwait which has
subsided since the suspension of combat operation by the coalition
forces and the retreat and subsequent withdrawal of Iraqi troops from
Kuwait, a more permanent cease-fire agreement is yet to be
22
June 28, 1919, Versailles, 13 A.J.I.L. Supp. 151; 16 A.J.I.L. Supp. 207;
UKTS 4 (1919), Command Papers 153.
23
Peace Treaty with Japan, 1951, TIAS No. 2490, 136 UNTS. 45.
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concluded 24 • The procedure adopted is unprecedented as the Security
Council has for the first time in its 45 years' history taken the initiative
not only to authorize by Resolution 678 the use of all measures
required to enforce compliance with its 11 previous resolutions from
Resolution 660 onwards, but has now proposed conditions to be
observed by Iraq for terminating the status of the existing armed
conflict. What appears to have created a precedent is the direct
involvement of the Security Council in the proposal, approval and
virtually in the negotiation of the terms and conditions for terminating
the armed conflict initiated by Iraq. This part of the peace-making
process is popularly known as the Cease-Fire Resolution.
The terms and conditions of the Cease-Fire Resolution to be
accepted and implemented by Iraq are obviously designed to restore
peace and order and to normalize relations between Iraq and its
neighbours. To ensure peaceful transition from the state of war to the
state of peace, or from the status of armed conflict to that of peaceful
coexistence and cooperation, the principles of friendly relations and
good-neighbourliness have guided the Security Council to prescribe
certain conditions.
For students of International Law, the process can be seen as the
adoption of measures to redress the wrongs committed by Iraq and to
make sure that no such wrongs could recur in the future. Thus we are
passing from the law regulating the use of force to the law of the State
Responsibility.

A. The Law of State Responsibility
In terms of the Law of State Responsibility, the Security Council has
clearly determined the existence of acts of aggression by Iraq in the Gulf
Crisis and has made many recommendations regarding such matters as
non-recognition of its annexation of Kuwait. It also imposed a
succession of economic sanctions and blockade against Iraq. There
are legal consequences attached to these as well as other decisions,
determinations and recommendations of the Security Council for all
States, international organizations and NGOs.
24
Thus, UNSC Resolution 688 on humanitarian assistance was not yet
accepted by Iraq as of April 18, 1991 when a Memorandum of Understanding
was signed between the Government of Iraq and the Secretary-General of the
United Nations following the two UN Missions, one led by Eric Suy (April1318, 1991) as Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General, and the other
UN Inter-Agency Mission led by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, Executive
Delegate of the UN Secretary-General of the UN Humanitarian Programme for
Iraq, Kuwait and the Iraq/Iran and Iraq/Turkey Border Areas (April 16-18,
1991) 30 ILM., 860-862 (1991).
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Iraq has been found responsible for each and all its internationally
wrongful acts against various injured States, principally Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and others. The Law of State Responsibility prescribes three
steps or tiers of remedial measures.
EX NUNC, as the first step, the State responsible for the
internationally wrongful acts is bound to cease and desist forthwith
from all acts found to be internationally wrongful. Thus, invasion must
be stopped and occupying forces withdrawn from Kuwait. The
annexation declared by Iraq must be annulled by appropriate
legislative enactment equivalent to the proclamation of annexation
itself. All prisoners of war and detainees including civilian hostages
must be released and repatriated.
EX TUNC, as the next step, the State committing the internationally wrongful act is required to make the reparation required of it by
international law. This may be achieved by "restitutio in integrum stricto
sensu" consisting of restitution or return of every object or property
taken in violation of international law and restoration in full of the
rights deprived or curtailed. For property lost or damaged and for death
and personal injuries, where restitution is not an appropriate redress, a
substitute obligation needs to be fulfilled by way of appropriate
compensation. The amount of monetary compensation is assessed in
accordance with the standard laid down by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Chorzow Factory Case and should serve "to
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act" including pecuniary
compensation even if it is materially impossible to wipe out the
injurious consequences 25 • Where pecuniary compensation is awarded as
a counterpart of an irreparable loss, it might resemble a "penalty". Yet
in many national legal systems such compensation is awarded as
"damages" rather than as "punishment".
EX ANTE signifies the final step in the implementation of measures
of redress available to the injured State. Monetary compensation by the
author State may not wholly make good the damage suffered by the
injured State as the result of the internationally wrongful act. Some
other satisfaction may be required, as indeed is often given by the
author State in the form of "apologies" and "guarantees" that the author
State will see to it that such wrongful acts will not be repeated in the
future. Such measures of satisfaction may be regarded as examples of ex
ante secondary obligations to be performed by the author State,
25
In this connection, see the Second Report of Professor Willem Rip hagen,
Special Rapporteur on the topic of State Responsibility, Document A/CN.4/
344, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1981, Vol. II (Part One),
pp. 79-101.
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involving the credibility of the primary rule itself, and not as a penalty
to which the author State is made liable 26 •

B. Implementation of Obligations Resulting from State Responsibility
As part and parcel of the peace-making process 27, the three steps or
three phases of measures to be undertaken by Iraq correspond to the
right of the injured State or States to present international claims in
respect of the wrongful acts committed by Iraq, engaging its State
responsibility. The preceding outline of steps and measures EX NUNC,
EX TUNC and EX ANTE appear to have been adequately taken into
consideration by the Security Council in its debate and decisionmaking, as evidenced by the adoption of the Cease-Fire Resolution of
April 3, 1991. Without commenting on all the conditions and
obligations to be undertaken and complied with by Iraq in the process
of peace-making as prescribed by the longest ever Security Council
Resolution 687 (3900 words) 28 , the following basic assurances,
undertakings and acceptances on the part of Iraq need to be outlined.
1. The First Series of Steps: EX NUNC- For immediate action apart
from the cessation of hostilities against Kuwait and the coalition forces,
Iraq is required to disengage its troops by completely withdrawing its
armed forces and military equipment from Kuwait and away from the
security zone set up by the coalition forces to ensure the security and
safety of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
A separate United Nations peace-keeping force is contemplated for
the task of overseeing completion of compliance with the Cease-Fire
Resolution in regard to each and every step in the process of peacemaking. The tasks undertaken by the United Nations as an
international organization are unequalled in the history of the World
Organization. The United Nations forces which will not include troops
from the States contributing to the multi-national coalition forces will
26

See Preliminary Report by the same Special Rapporteur, Document A/
CN. 4/330, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1980, Vol. II (Part
One), p. 113. This does not imply that there could never be an element of
vengeance in a "satisfaction" claimed by an injured State, as may be the case
when Israel presents her claims against Iraq for damage to property and personal
injurr suffered as the consequence of the various Scud Missiles attacks by Iraq.
2
The actual settlement of war claims or peace settlements could take much
longer than the process of peace-making. The principles of peace settlement
could be included in the peace treaties to be observed and performed long after
actual termination of the state of war. See, e. g., Vignes, La Commission de
Conciliation Franco-Italienne, 1955 Annuaire fran'<ais de droit international
212.
28
UNSC Resolution 687 (1991) of April3, 1991, 30 ILM at 847 (1991).
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be sent to help demarcate the boundary in the troubled border area
between Iraq and Kuwait.

a. Boundary Demarcation and Guarantee of Inviolability of KuwaitIraq Boundary
As part of the initial steps to be taken immediately to facilitate the
supervision of the withdrawal and exchange of prisoners of war across
the Iraq-Kuwait boundary, it is necessary to re-establish the boundary
line between the two countries. Thus, Part A. of the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) requires both Iraq and Kuwait
to respect the "inviolability of the international boundary and the
allocation of islands set out in the 'Agreed Minutes between the State of
Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq regarding the Restoration of Friendly
Relations, Recognition and Related Matters', signed by them in the
exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on October 4, 1963" 29 • For this
purpose, the United Nations Secretary-General is called upon to "lend
his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate
the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait drawing on appropriate
material, including the map transmitted by Security Council document
S/22412" 30 • The Security Council itself guarantees the inviolability of
this international boundary, which its demands Iraq and Kuwait to
respect and proceeded to take necessary measure as appropriate to that
end. 31
b. Deployment of a United Nations Observer Unit to Monitor the
Demilitarized Zone
To monitor the Khor Adbullah and a demilitarized zone, extending ten
kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the abovementioned international boundary to be demarcated, the SecretaryGeneral submitted within 3 days a plan for immediate deployment of a
United Nations Observer Unit, to deter violation of the boundary
through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone 32 •
29

Paragraph 2 of the operative Part A. The "Agreed Minutes" were
registered with the UN and published in Document 7063, UNTS, 1964,
reproduced in 30 ILM 855 (1991).
30
Paragraph 3 of the operative Part A.
31
Dr. Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja of Indonesia was sent to head a UN
demarcation team.
32
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Part B. of the UNSC Resolution 687. The unit will
also observe any hostile action mounted from the territory of one State to the
other, and for the Secretary-General to report to the Council immediately if
there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace. As soon as
deployment was completed, Member States cooperating with Kuwait would
bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with Resolution 686
(1991).
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c. Obligations to Cease and Desist from Acts of International
Terrorism
Operative Part H. of the Resolution contains a provision requiring Iraq
to refrain from "committing or supporting" any act of international
terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of
such acts to operate within its territory and to stop and discontinue
unequivocally all acts, methods and practices of terrorism. In this
particular connection, Iraq is also bound over (EX ANTE) to condemn
and renounce all such acts 33 •
Peace-keeping operation by the independent United Nations
Observer Unit will also serve to oversee compliance by Iraq with
other aspects of the cease-fire agreement. In particular, Iraq must cease
and desist from further aggravating the environmental holocaust
attributable to its forces in the explosion of the oil wells in flame that
continue to burn, and the oil-spills into the Persian Gulf resulting in
considerable damage to the marine environment as well as marine life
and other wildlife. Extinction of the fires and restoration to safe
conditions will be conducted at the ultimate expense of Iraq as part of
its EX TUNC obligation.
2. The Second Series of Steps: EX TUNC- For the damage caused,
there must be restitutio in integrum or pecuniary compensation. Iraq is
held responsible for the death, physical injury, loss of property and
damage, including environmental havoc resulting from her invasion and
occupation of Kuwait.

a. Repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third Country Nationals
As part of "restitutio in integrum" in respect of displaced persons as a
consequence of Iraq invasion and occupation of Kuwait, United
Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) Part G 34 imposes
additional duties on Iraq to extend all necessary cooperation to the
International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such
persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the
Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained and
facilitating the search by the International Committee for those Kuwaiti
and third country nationals still unaccounted for. The Red Cross is
invited to keep the Secretary-General apprised of all activities
undertaken in this regard.

33
34

See Paragraph 32.
See Paragraphs 30 and 31, 30 ILM 854 (1991 ).
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b. Return of All Kuwaiti Property Seized by Iraq
The Cease-Fire Resolution appears to have taken for granted the
obligation to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq since its
invasion and during its occupation of Kuwaiti territory. Property seized
by Iraq in Kuwait as well as elsewhere, must be returned to the original
owner.
For this purpose, Paragraph 15 35 of the Security Council Resolution
687 (1991) requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security
Council "on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti
property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property that Kuwait
claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact".
For the latter category of property not returned intact, a separate
treatment is provided in operative Part E.

c. Obligation to Make Reparation for Loss, Damage and Depletion of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Injury
Paragraph 16 in operative Part E of Security Council Resolution 687
(1991) reaffirms Iraq's liability "under international law for any direct
loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of
natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and
corporations as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of
Kuwait" 36 • This obligation to make reparation is without prejudice to
the debts and obligations of Iraq existing or arising prior to August 2,
1990. Repudiations by Iraq since August 2, 1990, of its foreign debt are
declared to be null and void and Iraq is required to fulfill all of its
obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debe 7 •

d. Mechanism and Procedure for Settlement of Claims
To give effect to the need to pay compensation for the claims envisaged
in Paragraph 16, the Security Council decides to create a fund and a
Commission that will administer the fund 38 • The Secretary-General has
been directed to develop and present to the Security-Council
recommendations for the fund to meet the requirements for the
payment of claims and a programme to implement its decisions that
Iraq fulfill all obligations to make reparation in this regard.
The Secretary-General submitted his report on May 2, 1991 39 ,
containing the requested recommendations. A United Nations Com35
36
37
38
39

See operative Part D. of the Resolution.
See Paragraph 16.
See Paragraph 17.
See Paragraph 18.
UN Document S/22599 (May 2, 1991).
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pensation Fund is to be created to be administered by a Governing
Council composed of representatives of the fifteen Members of the
Security Council in Geneva, Switzerland. The Governing Council
serves as the appointing authority to nominate members of the
Commission to administer the fund and to adjudicate the claims.
Policy decisions would be taken by a majority of no fewer than nine of
the members of the Council, without any one country having a veto
power. If consensus is not attainable, questions could be referred to the
Security Council on the request of any member of the Governing
Council.
The report also recommends "mechanisms for determining the
appropriate level of Iraq' contribution to the fund based on a percentage
of the value of the exports of petroleum products from Iraq not to
exceed a figure" as suggested by the Secretary-General, "taking into
account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity
as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions
taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the
Iraqi economy" 40 •
The report recommends arrangements for payments to be made to
the fund and the process whereby funds will be allocated for satisfaction
of awards on the claims 41 • The report covers claims from various
parties. The Secretary-General recommends that the injured States file
claims on their own behalf as well as on behalf of their nationals and
corporations. Claims concerning individuals could be disposed of
first 42 • The report suggests that each injured State decide for itself the
procedures to be followed internally in respect of the consolidation of
the claims having regard to its own system, practice and procedure 43 •
In line with this suggestion, a number of far-sighted injured States
have already paved the way for such procedures. In particular, President
Bush at a Press Conference on January 12, 1991 44 • emphasized, in no
uncertain terms, that one of the United Nations Security Council
Resolutions "relates to reparations" and that it was a very important
part of what the United Nations did. Even prior to that date, the
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee already introduced
a bill entitled Iraq claims of 1990 4 \ authorizing the Foreign Claims
40

This is in keeping with Paragraph 19 of UNSC Resolution 687 (1991).
This is consistent with UNSC Resolution 687 (1991 ), Paragraph 19.
42
See UN Document S/22559 (May 2, 1991).
43
Ibid., UN Document S/22559 (May 2, 1991).
44
The President's News Conference, January 12, 1991, 27 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 41 Ganuary 18, 1991).
45
Congressman Dante B. Fascell introduced an unnumbered bill on
October 24, 1990, Paragraph 2.
41
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Settlement Commission to receive and evaluate "claims against Iraq
resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait relating either to losses directly
resulting from Iraq's action or indirectly from steps taken to comply
with sanctions imposed in compliance with the United Nations. Such
claims may include compensation for increased security efforts required
by State and local governments and corporations to counter possible
terrorist activities in Iraq" 46 • The Settlement Commission is further
authorized to pay assistance from Iraqi funds now frozen to the families
of hostages held in Iraq, such sums as may be necessary to permit
dependents of such hostage to continue to have funds subject to
approval by the President.
Other Western coalition partners have been equally alert in
anticipating the collation of claims and evidence of injuries suffered
by their nationals and companies in Kuwait and Iraq. Thus, United
Kingdom nationals and companies were encouraged to notify the
losses, damage and injuries suffered 47 •
Not unmindful of the danger of simultaneous pursuits of
overlapping claims before domestic as well as the United Nations
Claims Commission, the Secretary-General proposes certain guidelines
to coordinate such claims. According to the procedure adopted, the
United Nations Secretariat would make a preliminary assessment to
determine whether the claims meet the requirements established by the
Governing Council. Panels of three commissioners would conduct
hearings and render recommendations or awards that are final in
accordance with the procedures for evaluating losses and verifying their
validity, subject only to the approval of the Governing Council. With an
indeterminate amount of claims which in all likelihood will exceed
available resources, criteria are being established for allocating funds,
giving some measure of priority to Kuwait as the prime victim of Iraq's
illegal acts 48 •
A United Nations Compensation Fund drawing from Iraqi oil
revenues will thus be created to pay the amounts of claims adjudged and
46

Ibid., Paragraph 3; see also Paragraph 6 approving efforts of the President
to seek UN actions to establish an international claims regime.
47
31 Commonwealth and Foreign Relations pt. 575 (1991 ), 56 Fed. Reg.
2112 Qanuary 18, 1991). See also Glod, International Claims Arising from Iraq's
Invasion of Kuwait, 25 The International Lawyer, 713-721 (1991).
48
As observed by Glod, "the task of sorting out, processing and eventually
paying war reparations in the aftermath of the Gulf War will indeed involve a
herculean effort", ibid., 25 The International Lawyer, at p. 721 (1991). Others
have proposed more drastic measures such as the lifting of foreign sovereign
immunities, suggested by David Caron in "Iraq and the Force of Law: Why
Give a Shield of Immunity?" 85 AJIL 89 (1991).
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awarded to Kuwait and other injured States as well as their citizens and
corporations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is directed
to supervise the establishment of this fund.
Although liability to pay compensation for the injury suffered is not
disputed by Iraq, the task of the United Nations extends to the
enforcement of the awards against Iraq. Parts of Iraqi assets seized or
frozen outside Iraq will be made available as part of the fund to be
allocated for payment of compensation, so as to ensure actual
implementation of the cease-fire agreement in regard to enforcement
measures and to give effect to the Cease-Fire Resolution specifying
Iraqi obligation to make reparation for the consequences of its
internationally wrongful acts.
In the field of environmental damage in respect of pollution of the
air, the sea and damage to wildlife and to the earth which has been
scorched by the burning fire from more than 600 oil wells, Iraq is also
held responsible, not only to Kuwait and other injured States for the
loss, injury and damage suffered, but also for the costs of cleaning up
smokes and pollution in the air by putting out the oil well fires, of
removing the oil spills in the Persian Gulf and of purifying the soil. The
United Nations Compensation Fund will also be available for
satisfaction of this category of claims.
The task of identifying financial sources to supplement the fund set
up for this purpose will be monumental. The work of sifting and
adjudicating the claims presented by various injured parties and victims
of Iraq's internationally wrongful acts associated with the invasion and
occupation of Kuwait as well as the landing of scud missiles on several
injured States will be assigned to an independent body under the
supervision of the United Nations. The work of the Commission may
be expected to continue for years and decades to come.
3. The Final Series of Steps: EX ANTE - To provide satisfaction
beyond monetary compensation, verbal apologies and unsecured
assurances, Iraq will be required to give more than oral pledges. The
United Nations must insist on a firm guarantee that Iraq is committed
to refrain from certain threats or acts of aggression or other
internationally wrongful acts of the most serious character. The
Security Council has assumed its institutional responsibility to make
sure that humanity will never again suffer from the recurrence of
nefarious activities by Iraq.
Based on past experience and upon clear and convincing evidence,
the Security Council must ensure that Iraq is denied the possibility and
deprived of the capacity to restage its acts of aggression against Iraq's
immediate and distant neighbours, and that weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons must be totally
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destroyed without foundation to regain production capabilities. The
Security Council must supervise and monitor the elimination of all
chemical and biological weapons as well as the total destruction of
ballistic missile system with a range of more than 95 miles and prevent
future development or acquisition of such arms or of nuclear arms.
Iraq's nuclear materials that could be used for the production of
weapons must be destroyed or removed by the International Atomic
Energy Agency.

a. Obligations under the Geneva Protocol (1925) and Prohibition of
Biological and Toxin Weapons
Part C of the Cease-Fire Resolution "invites Iraq to reaffirm
unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on
17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction of 10 April
1972" 49 • The Security Council also decides to impose on Iraq the
obligation to destroy, remove or render harmless, under international
superv1s10n
(i) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and
all related subsystems and components and all research, development,
support and manufacturing facilities;
(ii) All ballistic missiles with a range of greater than 150 kilometres
and related major parts, and repair and production facilities.
To this end, Iraq is required to submit a declaration of locations,
amounts and types of all items and agree to urgent on-site inspection.
The Secretary-General has developed a plan to accomplish this task in
consultation with appropriate Governments and with the Director of
World Health Organization (WH0? 0 , including
(i) The forming of a Special Commission to carry out immediate onsite inspection of Iraq' biological, chemical and missiles capabilities,
based on Iraq's declarations and designations of additional locations by
the Special Commission itself;
(ii) The surrender by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission
for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, of all chemical and
49

See Paragraph 7 of UNSC Resolution 687 (1991).
Ibid., Paragraph 9. Iraq is further required (Paragraph 10.) to undertake
not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items above specified subject
to on-going monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with this
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biological weapons, etc., and the destruction by Iraq under the
supervision of the Special Commission of all missiles capabilities, etc.;
(iii) The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and
cooperation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
regard to Iraq's obligations under (b) below.

b. Obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (1968)
Iraq is also invited to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty of July 1, 1968 51 • In
particular, Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop
nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable materials or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or
manufacturing facilities related to the above 52 •
For this purpose, the Specialized Agency concerned is the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose Director General
and the Secretary-General of the United Nations will receive from Iraq
a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items so
specified, which will be placed under the exclusive control for custody
and removal of the IAEA with the assistance of the Special Commission. Iraq is further required to accept urgent on-site inspection and the
destruction, removal and rendering harmless, as appropriate, of all items
related to nuclear weapons or usable materials for future on-going
monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with these
undertakings 53 • However, due to Iraq's reluctance to accept unconditionally most of these undertakings, monitoring and verification by the
IAEA Inspection Team have encountered some major obstacles. During
the week of September 23-27, 1991, an Inspection Team of 44 members
were detained in the parking lot of a nuclear facility, due to the
reluctance of Iraqi personnel to surrender items related to the
production of nuclear weapons. A compromise was not achieved until
the Inspection Team agreed to draw up an inventory of the items
removed 5 4 •
Avowedly, denuclearization represents a step towards the goal of
establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass
destruction and all missiles for their delivery and towards the object of a
global ban on chemical weapons 55 •
51
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c. Prohibition of Sale of Arms and Material
Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) 56 establishing a Security
Council Committee will continue in force until further notice. The
Cease-Fire Resolution 57 requires continuing prohibition of all sales or
supplies to Iraq by nationals of all States or from their territories or
using their flag vessels or aircraft of
(i) Arms and related materiel of all types, including specifically all
forms of conventional military equipment, for paramilitary forces, and
spare parts and components and the means of production for such
equipment;
(ii) Items identified as chemical and biological weapons as well as
nuclear weapons and usable materials;
(iii) Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements,
used for the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in
(i) and (ii);
(iv) Personnel and materials for training and technical support
services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use,
maintenance or support of the above items.
In other words, a total ban of all sales of any material or technology
which could conceivably enhance Iraq's war-making capabilities. States
and international organizations are called upon to observe this
prohibition, "notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licenses or any other arrangements" 58 •

d. Easing of Prohibition against the Sale or Supply of Commodities or
Products other than Medicine or Health Supplies
The general ban on the sale or supply of commodities or products other
than medicine and health supplies as contained in Security Council
Resolution 661 (1990) including prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto shall cease immediately with regard to "foodstuffs
notified to the Security Council Committee" or with the approval of
that Committee, "under the simplified and accelerated 'no objection'
procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as
identified in the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 March 1991,
and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee" 59 •
Such prohibitions as continue to apply are subject to periodic
review for further reduction or lifting 60 • As and when Iraq has
56
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completed all actions contemplated in connection with biological and
nuclear weapons, prohibitions against import of commodities and
products originating in Iraq and against financial transactions related
thereto shall have no further force and effect 61 • The Security Council
Committee is further empowered to approve, when required to assure
adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the
purchase or acquisitions of foodstuffs, materials and supplies for
essential civilian needs, exempted from the prohibition against the
import of commodities and products originating in Iraq. Thus, on
August 15, 1991, the Security Council allowed Iraq to sell US$ 1.6
billion worth of crude oil to be used exclusively for the purchase of
foodstuffs and other essential civilian needs for the survival of Iraq's
populace for the following six months' period. Iraq has complained that
it has lost US$ 17 billion as the result of the continuing ban on import
and export.

e. Obligation not to Support International Terrorism
As noted earlier, Iraq is also required to undertake not to support any
act of international terrorism and to renounce all acts, methods and
practices of terrorism 62 •
In addition, Iraq must give the fullest satisfaction to the whole
world by declaring that Iraq will not "commit or support" international
terrorism or allow any terrorist group to operate from its territory. This
restraint is consistent with the conduct of peace-loving States and
constitutes a minimum standard of good-neighbourliness.
The measures thus outlined in the form of obligations ex ante on the
part of Iraq are indispensable to the peace and security of mankind in
the region. They constitute minimal precautionary steps to prevent the
recurrence of further injurious consequences to neighbouring States and
the environment which constitutes the common heritage of mankind.

IV. Conclusion
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The United Nations have come a long way since its inception in San
Francisco. It should be observed with a sense of guarded optimism that
for once, and not by accident, the principal organ of the United Nations
primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and
security has been able to perform its functions as efficiently as could be
expected. For once the Organization is able and willing to fulfill its
primary aims and purposes.
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The requirement of periodic review of the status of compliance with
the cease-fire conditions by Iraq under the supervision of the Security
Council and monitored by the United Nations peace-keeping operations, including the various observation missions, units, teams and
guard contingents, will in fact enable the United Nations eventually to
lift most if not all of the economic and other sanctions imposed on Iraq
commensurate with the progress and complete satisfaction qf
compliance with each of the terms and conditions of the cease-fire
agreement. Slowly but surely, after convalescence and rehabilitation,
Iraq will be able to rejoin the peaceful community of nations of which it
once used to form part.
The World Organization, like any other international bodies, can
only be as strong and as effective as its members are willing to allow it
to be. In this particular connection, it is the will of the five permanent
members of the Security Council occupying the crucial and critical
position that is determinative of its strength and destiny. If only one of
the five should fail to play its responsible role, the whole mechanism of
the Organization is paralyzed.
Having come this far, the United Nations should be able to maintain
a steady and consistent course in the role it has learned to play with
patience and in good conscience to safeguard international peace and
security as well as to uphold human rights and dignity in a safe, sane,
viable and livable human environment.
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